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Note
Reverse-Spreigl Evidence: Challenging
Defendants' Obligation to Exceed
Prosecutorial Standards to Admit Evidence
of Third Party Guilt
Jayna M. Mathieu*
After midnight on July 27, 1994, William Gumtow shot and
killed Todd Goodwin.' The two men, tenants in the same Du-
luth, Minnesota, apartment building, had argued over Good-
win's role in an alleged theft of rent money.2 Gumtow testified
that Goodwin approached him with a raised hunting knife and
- J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999,
Saint Olaf College. The Author would like to thank Chad Oldfather, Donald
Dripps, Morgan Holcomb, Kara Lundy, and Kristina Carlson for their assis-
tance with this Note. Special thanks to Roger Paquin.
1. State v. Gumtow, No. C4-96-663, 1997 WL 161858, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 8, 1997). This case introduces the concepts of Spreigl and reverse-
Spreigl evidence. Spreigl evidence is evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts.
See John D. Becker, Evidence, A Survey of the Important Decisions of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court: The 1990-1991 Term, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187,
229 (1992). Although Spreigl incidents often resemble the charged crime, they
only may involve "misconduct other than the misconduct that is the subject of
the trial." Id. The prosecution uses evidence of these prior bad acts to help
establish the defendant's guilt in the charged crime. See State v. Spreigl, 139
N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. 1965).
Reverse-Spreigl evidence is evidence of a third party's prior bad acts.
State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 1997) (en banc) (citing State
v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1997) (en banc)). Defendants often intro-
duce reverse-Spreigl evidence to suggest that a third party committed the
charged crime. Id. In this context, reverse-Spreigl evidence helps defendants
cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case against them. Id. Defendants
also may use reverse-Spreigl evidence to support their self-defense claims.
State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1983) (en banc). They submit evi-
dence of the victim's prior violent acts to strengthen defense arguments that
the victim acted as the aggressor in the charged incident. Id.
2. Gumtow, 1997 WL 161858, at *1.
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that he shot Goodwin in self-defense.3 To strengthen his case,
Gumtow sought to use Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) to in-
troduce evidence of Goodwin's prior arrests.4 Under the rule,
defendants seeking to introduce such evidence must connect it
to the charged crime and prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence the third party's involvement in the prior bad act.5
Courts purport to determine the admissibility of this "reverse-
Spreigl evidence" by the same standard they use for "Spreigl
evidence," proof of the defendant's prior bad acts introduced by
the prosecution.6
In practice, however, courts tend to reach different results
in Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl cases.7 Contrary to a Spreigl
scenario, when defendants attempt to introduce reverse-Spreigl
evidence, trial courts frequently exclude it.8 Appellate courts,
which review these determinations for abuse of discretion, 9
generally uphold the decisions.10 State v. Gumtow1' is one such
3. Id.
4. Id. For the full text of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), see infra
note 40 and accompanying text. The text of the Minnesota Rule is nearly
identical to that of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See infra note 40.
5. Gumtow, 1997 WL 161858, at *1-2. Minnesota Rule of Evidence
404(b) departs from the corresponding Federal Rule by requiring that defen-
dants prove by clear and convincing evidence the third party's involvement in
the prior bad acts. The Federal Rule only requires a showing by the prepon-
derance of the evidence. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th Cir.
1986); see discussion infra note 40.
6. Gumtow, 1997 WL 161858, at *2.
7. See id. at *7 (Randall, J., specially concurring). Judge Randall sug-
gested that the Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl standards are not identically im-
plemented. Id. He noted that prior bad acts evidence is more likely to be ad-
mitted if the prosecution enters it against a defendant than if a defendant
introduces it to establish the guilt of a third party. Id. Compare State v. Wil-
liams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233-34 (Minn. 1999) (en banc) (upholding the exclusion
of evidence that the third party made threats and behaved violently due to the
defendant's failure to connect the third party to the charged crime), with State
v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. 1992) (en banc) (upholding the admission
into evidence of three prior incidents in which the defendant threatened vio-
lence against others). See infra Part C.1 (discussing Berry).
8. See Williams, 593 N.W.2d at 227; State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 466
(Minn. 1999) (en banc); State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 434 (Minn. 1997)
(en banc).
9. State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn. 2000) (en banc) ("Ad-
missibility is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the court's rul-
ing will be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion.").
10. See, e.g., State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449-50 (Minn. 1997) (en
banc) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in exclud-
ing reverse-Spreigl evidence); see also Johnson, 568 N.W.2d at 434 (holding
that the trial court's exclusion of the defendant's reverse-Spreigl evidence was
1034
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case. The trial court determined that Goodwin's prior arrests
for property damage, disorderly conduct, and assault did not
meet the reverse-Spreigl standard, and therefore were inad-
missible to support the defendant's self-defense claim. 12 In a
special concurrence, Judge Randall argued that his work on "a
few hundred" reverse-Spreigl cases leaves him certain that if
the state had offered similar incidents against the defendant,
the evidence "likely would have been admitted."13
This Note will demonstrate that Minnesota's reverse-
Spreigl standard restricts defendants' Sixth Amendment right
to introduce potentially exculpatory evidence.14 Part I exam-
within "a reasonable exercise of the district court's discretion").
11. 1997 WL 161858, at *1.
12. See id. at 1-2.
13. Id. at *7 (Randall, J., specially concurring).
14. The Sixth Amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In some cases, the reverse-Spreigl standard infringes upon defen-
dants' Sixth Amendment rights by preventing them from "present[ing] reliable
and exculpatory evidence and witnesses." Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting
a Burden of Production on the Defendant Before Admitting Evidence that
Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is It Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L.
REV. 272, 293-94 (1997) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)). The
case cited by Everhart, Washington v. Texas, held that the Sixth Amendment
right of compulsory process (the defendant's right to present witnesses to es-
tablish a defense) applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and that states may not deny defendants this right by
imposing arbitrary rules. 388 U.S. at 17-19, 22-23. A Minnesota case, State v.
Robinson, also addressed this concern. 536 N.W.2d 1, 1 (Minn. 1995). The
opinion stated that the Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl admissibility standards
are identical. Id. at 2. The court noted, "One difference is that Sixth Amend-
ment concerns ([the] right to confront one's accuser and [the] right to present
evidence) enter into the picture when it is the defendant who is seeking to pre-
sent the evidence." Id.
Restricting the admission of reverse-Spreigl evidence also implicates
rights derived from the Minnesota Constitution. State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d
451, 471 (Minn. 1999) (en banc). The relevant provision states, "No person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and
no person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 7. This Note focuses on the federal constitutional rights because that
analysis provides insight into the constitutionality of similar rules in other
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ines the historical development of the Spreigl and reverse-
Spreigl standard and the ways that courts currently implement
it. Part II compares the application of the test in these situa-
tions and discusses the constitutional problems posed by the
standard in reverse-Spreigl cases. Part III proposes amending
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) to include a separate stan-
dard for reverse-Spreigl evidence. This Note concludes that the
reverse-Spreigl standard, particularly as most Minnesota
courts apply it, limits the ability of defendants to present their
cases and must be lowered to avoid continued infringement
upon their Sixth Amendment rights.
I. SPREIGL AND REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE:
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIOR
BAD ACTS ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD
Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl evidence serve very different
purposes. 15 They are rooted in two distinct lines of cases that
begin with separate sources. The standard for admitting these
two types of evidence, however, purports to be the same. The
following introduction to the development of Spreigl and re-
verse-Spreigl evidence facilitates a comparison of the ways
courts treat these cases. This comparison demonstrates the in-
adequacy of using a single standard for both Spreigl and re-
verse-Spreigl cases.
A. SPREIGL EVIDENCE IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT
When prosecutors introduce evidence of a defendant's prior
bad acts, they suggest that the Spreigl incidents make it more
likely than it would be without the evidence that the defendant
committed the charged crime. 16 Prosecutors frequently attempt
to introduce Spreigl evidence against criminal defendants.
Since 1999, the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota
Supreme Court have heard more than one hundred cases in
which defendants appealed trial courts' admissions of Spreigl
evidence.17 The prevalence of these cases emphasizes the need
to examine Spreigl evidence and the role it plays in Minnesota
states as well as the corresponding federal rule.
15. See discussion supra note 1.
16. See discussion supra note 1.
17. The Author determined this figure by counting the applicable cases.
This total combines the cases heard by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the
Minnesota Court of Appeals.
1036 [Vol.86:1033
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jurisprudence.
In State v. Fichette, 18 an early twentieth century case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the admissibility of prior
bad acts evidence. 19 The case involved a Minneapolis police of-
ficer appealing his bribery conviction.20 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court concluded that the prior bad act, which involved
the defendant taking another bribe under similar circum-
stances, unfairly prejudiced the defendant. 21 The court noted
that "the general rule forbids the introduction of evidence
which will show, or tend to show, that the accused has commit-
ted any crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is
on trial."22 Courts may only admit prior bad acts evidence that
fits within one of several exceptions to this general rule.23 The
court reversed the defendant's conviction because the prior bad
acts evidence should not have been admitted, as it did not fit
within any exception. 24
18. 92 N.W. 527 (Minn. 1902).
19. Id. at 528-29. This Note refers to the evidence in Fichette as "prior
bad acts evidence" rather than as "Spreigi evidence" because Fichette predates
the Spreigl decision.
20. Fichette, 92 N.W. at 527-28. The bribery charge in this case arose
from assertions that the defendant accepted cash in exchange for helping an-
other police officer be reappointed. Id.
21. Id. In the prior incident, the defendant allegedly accepted money to
help an applicant gain a position as a police officer. Id. at 528.
22. Id. at 528 (citing H.C. UNDERHILL, CRIMnAL EVIDENCE, § 87 (1898).
23. Id.; see also Chad M. Oldfather, Other Bad Acts and the Failure of
Precedent, 28 WM. ITCHELL L. REV. 151, 154-55 (2001) (discussing Fichette).
The Fichette court stated that courts admit prior bad acts evidence under the
following circumstances:
as where facts tend to show a distinct hostility, jealousy, or erotic
passion indicated by a previous criminal act; or where the transaction
depends upon the specific intent with which it is committed, when the
claim can be made that the investigated act was the result of a mis-
take; or where the identity of the accused or of the instrumentality to
perpetrate the crime is so connected or involved in some other act of
guilt that one relates to the other; or, again, where the previous of-
fense is a part of a scheme or conspiracy incidental to or involved in
the one on trial.
Fichette, 92 N.W. at 528.
24. Fichette, 92 N.W. at 529. While Fichette is a solid example of an early
prior bad acts evidence case, not all decisions followed its model. See Oldfa-
ther, supra note 23, at 156-57. In State v. Ames, a case factually similar to
Fichette, the court admitted Spreigl evidence of a bribe previously accepted by
a police officer. 96 N.W. 330, 333 (Minn. 1903), noted in Oldfather, supra note
23, at 155-56. The Ames court created a new rule in which "evidence of the
commission of other crimes is admissible when it tends corroboratively or di-
rectly to establish the defendant's guilt of the crime charged in the indictment
on trial, or some essential ingredient of such offense." Id.
20021 1037
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More than sixty years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided the case most commonly associated with prior bad acts
evidence. In State v. Spreigl,25 the defendant appealed his con-
viction for raping his eleven-year-old stepdaughter.26 The trial
court admitted evidence that the defendant had previously
forced the alleged victim to engage in sexual activities as well
as evidence that the defendant similarly abused other children
in the family.27 The Minnesota Supreme Court ordered a new
trial because the defendant received insufficient notice of the
state's intention to introduce other instances of sexual abuse.28
Although the decision rested on procedural grounds, the
Spreigl opinion provides insight into the factors courts should
consider when determining whether to admit Spreigl evi-
dence.29
The Spreigl court reiterated that evidence of prior bad acts
should not be admitted unless it fits within an exception to the
general exclusionary rule.30 Such evidence is only admissible
"to show motive, to negative mistake, to establish identity," or
to demonstrate that the prior bad act is part of a scheme or
conspiracy connected to the one being charged.31 The court
stated that in close cases, evidence of prior bad acts should be
excluded pursuant to the accused's right "'to be given the bene-
fit of the doubt." 32
Spreigl also discussed the relevance of prior bad acts evi-
dence. 33 The Spreigl court stated, "'The assumption of [Spreigl
evidence's] probative value is made throughout the judicial
opinions on this subject.' 34 Since Spreigl evidence generally is
relevant to the charged crime, the more important inquiry is
whether the evidence will inappropriately bias the judge and
25. 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965).
26. Id. at 168.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 172-73.
29. Id. at 171-72.
30. Id. at 169.
31. Id. Comparing the two sets of exceptions indicates that the court in
Spreigi accurately paraphrased the list established in Fichette. See supra note
23.
32. Spreigi, 139 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting State v. Fichette, 92 N.W. 527,
528 (Minn. 1902)).
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 193-94 (3d ed.
1940).
1038 [Vol.86:1033
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the jury against the defendant:35
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal... is to give ex-
cessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and ei-
ther to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take
the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the
present charge. 36
After Spreigl, courts added standards that the prosecution
must meet before admitting evidence of defendants' prior bad
acts.37 These requirements include proving by clear and con-
vincing evidence the defendant's involvement in the Spreigl in-
cident and introducing evidence of a connection in time, place,
or modus operandi between the charged crime and the Spreigl
events.3
8
In 1977, the state adopted MAinnesota Rule of Evidence
404(b), a rule regulating the admission of Spreigl evidence. 39
The rule states,
Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts. Evidence of another crime, wrong, or
act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent. In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not be admitted
unless the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation in it by a
relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence.40
35. See id.
36. Id. (quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 193-94 (3d ed.
1940)). If the evidence's probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice,
courts should admit it. Id. In this context, prejudice refers to "the unfair ad-
vantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegiti-
mate means." State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 197 n.3 (Minn. 1995) (quoting
State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 n.2 (Minn. 1985) quoting 22 CHARLES
WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE_
EVIDENCE § 5215, at 275 (1978)). As part of the prejudice inquiry, courts con-
sider the need for the proffered evidence. See id. at 197 n.2. This need can be
established both when the evidence is necessary to convict the defendant and
when "it is not clear that the jury will believe the state's other evidence bear-
ing on the disputed issue." Id.
37. Oldfather, supra note 23, at 165.
38. State v. Billstrom, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Minn. 1967). That case
includes additional procedural requirements that the state must satisfy. The
prosecution must provide notice to the defendant of its intention to introduce
Spreigl evidence. It also must state which exception to the general exclusion-
ary rule is being invoked. Id.
39. Oldfather, supra note 23, at 151-52.
40. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b). The Minnesota Rule also states that
"[elvidence of past sexual conduct of the victim in prosecutions under Minn.
Stats. § 609.342 to 609.346 is governed by Minn. R. Evid. 412." The Federal
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:1033
At the time of its adoption, courts and commentators
widely classified the rule as a codification of existing case law,
rather than a new approach to determining the admissibility of
Spreigl evidence.41 Therefore, the process of determining the
admissibility of Spreigl evidence probably changed very little as
a result of Minnesota's adoption of the evidentiary rule.
B. REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Reverse-Spreigl rules limit defendants' ability to introduce
evidence that a third party committed the charged crime.42
Rule of Evidence does not include this provision:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of
the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis added).
The italicized portion of the Federal Rule does not appear in the Minnesota
Rule. Following Spreigl and Billstrom, similar notice provisions apply in Min-
nesota even though the text of Minnesota Rule 404(b) does not require them.
The Federal Rule codified the deciding principle in State v. Spreigl-that the
prosecution must provide reasonable notice of its intent to introduce evidence
of the defendant's prior bad acts. See Oldfather, supra note 23, at 165-66.
The most significant difference between the Minnesota Rule and the Fed-
eral Rule involves the standard the prosecution must meet before introducing
evidence of prior bad acts. Federal courts may admit this evidence if the proof
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the
prior act. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th Cir. 1986). In
Minnesota, the state must introduce clear and convincing evidence linking the
defendant to the Spreigl event. See State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 433
(Minn. 1997) (en banc). That the Minnesota standard is higher than the fed-
eral standard helps defendants in a Spreigl context; it holds the prosecution to
a heightened evidentiary standard for admitting evidence of a defendant's in-
volvement in a prior bad act. However, when a defendant attempts to suggest
that a third party committed the charged crime, the Federal Rule requires
that defendant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
third party committed a prior bad act. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); Ebens, 800 F.2d at
1432. The Minnesota Rule requires that proof to meet a clear and convincing
standard. Minn. R. Evid 404(b); Johnson, 568 N.W.2d at 433. Therefore, in a
reverse-Spreigl context, the Minnesota Rule is harder on defendants than the
corresponding Federal Rule. Accordingly, the Minnesota Rule creates a
greater infringement upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights than does
Federal Rule 404(b). See discussion infra Part II.
41. See Oldfather, supra note 23, at 166-67.
42. See State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 1997) (describing
the requirements that defendants must meet to introduce reverse-Spreigl evi-
1040
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When courts admit the evidence, defendants use it to help cre-
ate reasonable doubt about their guilt by suggesting that a
third party committed the charged crime.43 This type of evi-
dence has a long tradition in United States jurisprudence44 and
most states have a version of reverse-Spreigl evidence. 45
State v. Lilja46 represents Minnesota's early approach to
third party evidence cases. In Lilja, a jury found the defendant
guilty of murdering a man in the victim's rural home.47 The
trial court excluded from evidence a letter inviting the victim to
purchase grain alcohol and testimony that the police found
empty alcohol bottles near the murder scene.48 Despite the de-
fendant's arguments, the Minnesota Supreme Court defended
the exclusion of the evidence. 49 That court found "[t]here was
nothing tending to connect the letter, these bottles or the writer
of the letter with anything that occurred in connection with the
dence).
43. State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn. 1977). In criminal
cases, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
charged crime. State v. Ewing, 84 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. 1957). Some
scholars question whether the state can constitutionally place limits on defen-
dants' ability to introduce evidence for this purpose. See discussion infra Part
II.
44. See State v. Bock, 39 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 1949) (citing 2 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYsTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 304 (3d ed. 1940)). The court in Bock
quoted Wigmore's description of third party evidence:
It should be noted that this kind of evidence may be also available to
negative the accused's guilt. E.g. if A is charged with forgery, and
denies it, and if B can be shown to have done a series of similar for-
geries connected by a plan, this plan of B is some evidence that B and
not A committed the forgery charged.
Id.
45. See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND STATE COURTS 404-132 to 404-162 (1996) (outlining numerous
states' versions of Federal Rule of Evidence 404).
46. 193 N.W. 178 (Minn. 1923).
47. Id. at 178.
48. Id. at 180.
49. Id. The "third party" evidence in this case likely served two functions.
First, it suggested that someone else committed the crime. Second, the evi-
dence implied that the victim was involved with alcohol, which is significant
since the case was decided during prohibition. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 63 YEARS OF MINNESOTA ALCOHOL
BEVERAGE REGULATION, at http'/ww.dps.state.mn.us/alcgamb/alcenf/
lchist.html (2001). The inference, therefore, would have reflected negatively
on the victim's character.
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murder nor with any one [sic] concerned in its commission."50
Noting that the facts could have caused the jury to believe that
someone other than the defendant (likely a "bootlegger") com-
mitted the murder, the court excluded the evidence. 51 The Lilja
court found that these facts alone could not justify such an in-
ference.52
In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the state's
seminal third party evidence case, State v. Bock.53 Bock faced
forgery charges. 54 He allegedly stole a check-printing machine,
created fake checks, and attempted to cash them.55 The trial
court excluded the defendant's evidence that another person
had passed checks identical to those in the charged crime.56 In
its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the de-
fendant
should also have the right to show that crimes of a similar nature
have been committed by some other person when the acts of such
other person are so closely connected in point of time and method of
operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of defendant as the
person who committed the crime charged against him.
57
The court considered the similarity between the charged
crimes and the third party's conduct and concluded that the
trial court erred by excluding the defendant's evidence.58
The Minnesota Supreme Court's next major reverse-
Spreigl decision came more than twenty-five years later. In
State v. Hawkins,59 a murder case, the court reviewed a trial
court's exclusion of evidence that the state's primary witness
killed the victim. 60 It stated that because the third party was a
50. Lilja, 193 N.W. at 180.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Lilja court required a connection in time, place, or modus op-
erandi between the charged crime and the third party evidence. Id. Courts
frequently exclude third party evidence because it lacks such a connection.
See, e.g., State v. Porter, 411 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that because the defendant made no showing connecting the third party to the
crime, "his proffered evidence had little or no probative value and was largely
irrelevant to the facts of this case").
53. 39 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. 1949).
54. Id. at 888.
55. Id. The prosecution claimed that the defendant made three attempts
to cash forged checks. Id. at 888-89.
56. Id. at 892.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 260 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1977).
60. Id. at 159. The defendant sought to introduce evidence that the
state's witness and the victim spoke about stolen guns and that the witness
1042
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witness for the prosecution, "with a possible motive to convict
the defendant to save himself," the reverse-Spreigl evidence
was "especially applicable."61 The court held that the trial
court should have permitted the defendant to introduce the
evidence. 62
C. THE MODERN CASES
For purposes of comparison, this Note discusses two cases,
State v. Berry63 , a Spreigl case, and State v. Profitj a reverse-
Spreigl case. These cases provide a framework for examining
the ways that modem courts treat Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl
evidence. 65
1. A Spreigl Case: State v. Berry
In State v. Berry, a jury found the defendant guilty of first-
degree murder for the act of inducing his friend to kill one of
their acquaintances. 66 During a party held at his home, the de-
fendant allegedly indicated to several individuals that he
wanted the victim to die.67 The state introduced evidence that
the victim owed the defendant twelve hundred dollars and also
that the defendant believed the victim was "a snitch."68 The
state presented evidence that the defendant asked his friend,
the state's principal witness, to kill the victim, but the witness
refused.69 The defendant then allegedly asked another individ-
ual to murder the victim.7 0 The prosecution argued that the
person who ultimately agreed to perform the act drove away
tended to become violent while intoxicated. Id. at 158.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 160.
63. 484 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 1992) (en banc).
64. 591 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 1999) (en banc).
65. These particular cases provide examples of the typical decisions courts
currently issue. Both are Minnesota Supreme Court decisions that include
significant discussion of admissibility issues.
66. 484 N.W.2d at 15. Under Minnesota law, one is "criminally liable for
a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires,
counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the
crime." MINN. STAT. § 609.05, subd. 1 (1990). The defendant was charged
with violating this statute. Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 15.
67. See Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 15. The defendant acknowledged threaten-
ing to kill the victim, but denied soliciting anyone to kill her. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id.
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with the victim.71 Between thirty and forty-five minutes later,
the suspected murderer returned to the party by himself.72
The trial court admitted Spreigl evidence of three prior
acts the defendant committed.73 The first act took place eight
years before the act being prosecuted in this trial.74 In this
first incident, the defendant went to the home of a man he
wanted to punish for "snitching." 5 A witness who accompanied
the defendant to the house "testified that he heard things being
broken inside the house and a loud bang or report which
sounded like a gun-shot."76 In the second Spreigl incident, the
defendant told a woman's roommates that "he wanted to beat
up [the woman] and to kill her because she had snitched on
him."7 7 In the last instance, approximately one month before
the conduct at issue, the defendant pointed a gun at a man's
head and threatened to "beat his ass" if the man did not do as
commanded;7 8 the man complied with the defendant's order
and the defendant took no further action against him.79
The trial court found that the evidence satisfied each ele-
ment of the Spreigl test.80 The defendant argued that none of
the three incidents was sufficiently similar to the charged
crime.81 In response, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that
"absolute similarity between the charged offense and the
Spreigl incident is not required to establish relevancy"82 and
that "[e]ach of the three incidents [was] relevant because of the
similarity of the way [the defendant] behaved when trying to
maintain control of the people with whom he worked."83 Ac-
cordingly, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant used
71. Id. The defendant remained at the party while the suspected mur-
derer was gone. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 16. The Minnesota Supreme Court's list of Spreigl elements
is nearly identical to the elements it lists in the reverse-Spreigl case discussed
in Part I.C.2. See infra text accompanying note 98. The court also noted that
the defendant held the burden of showing that the trial court erred in admit-
ting evidence of each Spreigl incident. See Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 17.
81. See Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 17.
82. Id. (citing State v. Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854, 860 (Minn. 1991)).
83. Id.
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threats and violent acts against people who had "snitched" on
him.84 The court found that the state needed the evidence to
show that the defendant "carried out his threats."85 Further-
more, it determined that "[the probative value of the Spreigl
evidence outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice" because
there was "no danger that the jury would punish [the defen-
dant] for his past acts."86 The Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cluded that the Spreigl evidence "complete[d] the picture" of the
defendant, but did not "paint another picture."87 Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Spreigl evi-
dence. 88
In dissent, Justice Gardebring argued that the admission
of the Spreigl evidence constituted an abuse of discretion.89
Disputing the majority's finding that the Spreigl events estab-
lished the defendant's modus operandi,90 Gardebring noted that
the concept of modus operandi would be expanded "so far...
that any history of threats or violence becomes proof that a de-
fendant was merely committing a crime in his or her usual
manner."91 Justice Gardebring therefore reasoned that the
Spreigl incidents suggest that the defendant "talk[s] tough" and
"damag[es] property" but do not establish that the defendant
followed a modus operandi in the victim's murder.92
2. A Reverse-Spreigl Case: State v. Profit
In State v. Profit,93 a jury found the defendant guilty of the
May 1996 murder of a prostitute.94 The prosecution success-
fully admitted evidence of two rapes and a sexual assault com-
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 18. The court stated that the evidence was probative of his in-
tent to kill the victim and of his modus operandi in making and carrying out
threats. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. "[Aidmission of Spreigl evidence rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court." Id. at 17 (citing State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 503
(Minn. 1991)).
89. Id. at 20 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 21 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 20 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Gardebring, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion noted that the
defendant faced charges of requesting that another man murder the victim,
whereas the Spreigl events suggested a "hot tempered" impulsivity inconsis-
tent with this method of killing. Id. at 21 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
93. 591 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 1999).
94. Id. at 455.
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mitted by the defendant before the charged incident.95 The de-
fendant attempted to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence show-
ing that the murder at issue was part of a series and that he
had identified the serial killer.9 6 The district court excluded
this evidence, which included proof that linked the third party
to a handwritten letter confessing to one of the murders.97 The
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that before it would admit
reverse-Spreigl evidence, the defendant must show (1) "'clear
and convincing evidence'" of the third party's involvement in
the reverse-Spreigl incident; (2) that the reverse-Spreigl inci-
dent is relevant and material to the charged crime; and (3) that
the "'probative value" of the reverse-Spreigl incident exceeds
the "potential for unfair prejudice'" created by its admission
into evidence.98
To be relevant, a "reverse[-]Spreigl incident must be simi-
lar to the charged offense either in time, location, or modus op-
erandi." 99 The court acknowledged numerous similarities be-
tween the charged murder and the series of killings. 100 Despite
creating an inference that the same perpetrator committed all
95. Id. at 457. All three prior crimes took place in north Minneapolis,
Minnesota, during early September 1981, approximately fifteen years before
the charged crime. Id.
96. Id. at 463.
97. Id. at 462. Prior to trial, the trial court excluded this evidence in re-
sponse to the prosecution's motion in limine. Id. at 463. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by exclud-
ing the evidence. Id. In its discussion of the issue, the court noted that the
"circumstances surrounding" the letter "do little to ensure its validity." Id. at
465. The court stated that the police affidavits about the letter "indicate[d]
that the police suspected [the defendant], not [the third party], had committed
the killings." Id. at 466. According to the court, the police believed the third
party's argument that the defendant had ordered the third party to write the
letter. Id.
The court also noted that the defense failed to call the third party to
testify at trial. Id. at 463. Without such testimony, the letter was hearsay.
Id. at 466. In dissent, Justice Russell Anderson noted that by granting the
state's motion in limine, the trial court prevented the defendant from ques-
tioning the third party about the letter at trial. Id. at 471 (R. Anderson, J.,
dissenting). The defendant claimed "there was no longer any purpose" in call-
ing the third party because the court's ruling on the prosecution's motion
barred the defense from eliciting the third party's testimony about the letter.
Id. at 463.
98. Id. at 463-64 (quoting State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn.
1997) (en banc)).
99. Id. at 464 (quoting State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn.
1997) (en banc)).
100. Id. The court noted that the police investigated the charged murder
as one of the serial killings, as the defendant argued. Id.
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of the murders, 01 the court concluded that "this inference was
of little value to [the defendant] unless he also provided clear
and convincing evidence102 that someone other than he...
committed the killings."1 0 3 The Profit court also emphasized
that appellate courts should grant great deference to trial
courts in evidence matters.1 4 Thus, "taken as a whole," the
court concluded, "the record does more to suggest that [the de-
fendant] committed all of the purported serial killings than to
show clear and convincing evidence that [the third party] par-
ticipated in any of them."10 5 As a result, the court found no
abuse of discretion in the lower court's exclusion of the defen-
dant's reverse-Spreigl evidence. 0 6
Justice Russell Anderson, who dissented on the reverse-
Spreigl issue, disagreed with the majority's characterization of
the defendant's evidence.107 He noted that the third party
could access the defendant's car, which contained "[t]he only di-
rect evidence" implicating the defendant. 0 8 Justice Anderson
called the reverse-Spreigl evidence "all the more compelling"
because the state used Spreigl evidence against the defen-
dant.'0 9 He concluded that the court committed prejudicial er-
ror when it excluded the defendant's reverse-Spreigl evi-
dence.110
101. Id.
102. Id. The court defined clear and convincing evidence as 'more than a
preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
Id. (quoting Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1978)). The court
used examples of clear and convincing evidence from a Spreigl context, ex-
plaining that a conviction, a confession, or a victim's clear identification of the
defendant as the perpetrator of a prior crime would establish the defendant's
participation in the crime by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 466.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 469-70.
108. Id. at 469 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting). The car contained some fibers
similar to those used to strangle the murder victim. Id. The defendant's wal-
let also was found near the site where the victim's body was discovered. Id.
The defendant provided testimony that he stored his wallet in his car. Id.
This evidence and the letter led Justice Russell Anderson to conclude that the
majority deprived the defendant of his right "to present a defense in a criminal
trial" under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Id. at 470-
71.
109. Id. at 470 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 471 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting). See supra note 95 and accom-
panying text for a description of the Spreigl incidents admitted.
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II. THE HEIGHTENED ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD FOR
REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. THE SPREIGL AND REVERSE-SPREIGL STANDARDS: IDENTICAL
LANGUAGE, DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS
The cases previously outlined for comparison, Berry and
Profit, help illustrate the differences in treatment that courts
give to Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl evidence. To be admitted,
reverse-Spreigl incidents must be nearly identical to the crime
being charged."n Even though the police originally investi-
gated the murder in Profit as one of a series,112 the court pre-
vented the defendant from introducing evidence showing a con-
nection between a third party and one of the previous
killings. 113 The Spreigl incidents admitted in Berry have less in
common with the charged crime than the reverse-Spreigl
events excluded in Profit.114 In Berry, the defendant verbally
threatened individuals in two separate instances and used a
gun to threaten a man in the third.115 The defendant did not
dispute threatening to kill the victim. 116 However, he did deny
asking another man to murder the victim. 1 7 The majority
overlooked this difference in modus operandi and found that
111. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 434 (Minn. 1997) (en
bane). The Johnson court concluded the trial court properly excluded the re-
verse-Spreigl evidence. Id. The trial and appellate courts agreed the evidence
lacked similarity with the charged incident, id., even though the two incidents
occurred within sixteen months of one another, twenty blocks apart, and both
involved a group of juveniles shooting a .22 caliber handgun into a car with
Asian American passengers. Id. The court based its holding in part on the
fact that one was a random shooting while the other involved retaliatory mo-
tives. Id.
112. Profit, 591 N.W.2d at 456.
113. Id. at 466. The defendant's best reverse-Spreigl evidence was a letter
in which the third party confessed to committing a similar murder. Id. at 465.
That murder took place "under nearly identical circumstances," a few weeks
later, and less than two blocks away from the site where the victim in the
charged crime was found. Id. at 470-71 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting). The
third party later repudiated that confession. Id. at 466.
114. For a description of the Spreigl incidents admitted in Berry, see supra
notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
115. State v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Minn. 1992) (en banc).
116. Id. at 16.
117. Id.
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the trial court "properly admitted" 118 the threats as Spreigl evi-
dence that the defendant ordered the victim's murder.' 19 Had a
defendant introduced that evidence in a reverse-Spreigl con-
text, it probably would not have been admitted.
Minnesota courts also require a tighter connection in time
between the Spreigl incident and the crime charged when a de-
fendant, rather than the state, seeks to introduce the evidence.
The first Spreigl incident admitted in Berry took place eight
years before the charged crime. 120 In contrast, courts fre-
quently conclude that reverse-Spreigl incidents are too old to be
admitted. In his Gumtow special concurrence, Judge Randall
compared the way that courts treat the age of Spreigl and re-
verse-Spreigl evidence.121 He noted that trial courts admit
Spreigl evidence of events up to twenty years old, but rarely
provide reverse-Spreigl incidents with such lenient treat-
ment.
122
The Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl tests also differ in the way
courts approach prejudice issues. In Spreigl and reverse-
Spreigl cases, courts determine if the probative value of the ex-
traneous incident exceeds its potential for prejudice. 123 In
Berry, the court found the Spreigl evidence to be probative on
the issue of whether the defendant ordered the victim's mur-
der. 124 The majority, however, overstated the evidence's power.
The court found that the Spreigl evidence reflected upon the
defendant's modus operandi of carrying out the threats he
made. 125 Yet, none of the Spreigl incidents involved the defen-
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. The dissent argued that the Spreigl incidents were so dissimilar
that they made the defendant's participation in the charged crime seem less
likely. Id. at 21 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 16. In Profit, the Spreigl crimes took place fifteen years before
the defendant's trial. State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Minn. 1999) (en
banc). Berry and Profit are not comparable on this point, however, because in
Profit the defendant spent the majority of the ensuing fifteen years in prison.
Id.
121. State v. Gumtow, No. C4-96-663, 1997 WL 161858, at *7 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 8, 1997) (Randall, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 1997) (en banc) (stat-
ing that admitting reverse-Spreigl evidence requires "a showing that the pro-
bative value of the reverse[-]Spreigl evidence outweighs its potential for unfair
prejudice").
124. Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 18.
125. Id.
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dant acting on his threats. 126 Further, the court dismissed the
evidence's potential for prejudice.12 7 It simply stated that the
jury would not punish the defendant for the Spreigl inci-
dents, 128 largely ignoring the human tendency to allow un-
charged bad acts to weigh into decisions about defendants' guilt
and punishment.129 The court's perfunctory review of prejudice
issues was insufficient to establish that the Spreigl evidence
would not inappropriately bias the jury against the defendant,
a key inquiry in determining the evidence's admissibility. 130
The Profit court seemed particularly confused when it ap-
plied prejudice concerns in the reverse-Spreigl context. In that
case, the majority and dissent expressed different conclusions
about the probative value of the defendant's reverse-Spreigl
evidence. 131 Yet neither opinion addressed whether the exclu-
sion of the evidence resulted in prejudice. 132 This omission
could result from uncertainty about the way prejudice functions
in reverse-Spreigl cases. In Spreigl cases, the rules seek to
prevent juries from using prior misconduct to conclude that the
defendant conformed with his poor character in committing the
charged crime. 133 In reverse-Spreigl cases, the extraneous inci-
dents involve third parties, not defendants. 134 They, therefore,
will not prejudice defendants as they might in Spreigl cases. 135
126. Id. at 16-17.
127. Id. at 18.
128. Id.
129. See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. 1965); supra note 36
and accompanying text.
130. See Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d at 172.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 105 and 107-08. Compare State v.
Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 466 (Minn. 1999) (en banc) (majority opinion), with
Profit, 591 N.W.2d at 469-70 (dissenting opinion).
132. See generally Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451.
133. See Joan L. Larsen, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The
Accused's Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend
Rule 404(b), 87 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 658 (1993) (noting that the standards of
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) are designed to protect defendants).
134. See id. at 657-60 (discussing the greater risk of prejudice in admitting
prior bad acts evidence committed by defendants than when committed by
third parties).
135. See United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir.
1984). In Aboumoussallem, the Second Circuit recognized that admissibility
considerations may require adaptation when defendants use them to introduce
potentially exculpatory evidence. Id. The Aboumoussallem court stated that
"the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers similar acts
evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a prosecutor uses such
evidence as a sword." Id.
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Only the omission of this evidence negatively affects defen-
dants.136
Two other considerations assist the state in introducing
Spreigl incidents but work against defendants seeking to admit
reverse-Spreigl evidence. First, Spreigl evidence carries a pre-
sumption of probativeness. 137 Although reverse-Spreigl evi-
dence permits the trier of fact to identify the person who com-
mitted the charged crime, the evidence, unlike Spreigl
evidence, has no such presumption. 138 Courts frequently ex-
clude reverse-Spreigl evidence for lacking probative value. 139
Second, courts exclude Spreigl evidence in close cases to give
defendants the benefit of the doubt.140 As the courts currently
interpret the rule, no comparable presumption exists in favor of
admitting reverse-Spreigl evidence when the defendant nearly
satisfies every element of the test. 141
These differences in applicable presumptions may appear
sensible when one considers that Spreigl rules are designed to
protect defendants. Defendant protections, however, should
not be limited to Spreigl cases. Reverse-Spreigl cases should
involve similar considerations based on defendants' constitu-
tional right to present exculpatory evidence. 142 The lack of
these protections in reverse-Spreigl cases makes it more diffi-
cult for defendants to introduce exculpatory evidence than it is
for the prosecution to admit evidence of defendants' previous
misdeeds. This discrepancy is particularly egregious because
reverse-Spreigl evidence relates directly to the incident being
charged. Hence, it is highly relevant and merits consideration
by the fact-finder. In contrast, Spreigl evidence has a more in-
136. The omission of credible reverse-Spreigl evidence harms defendants
because it denies them the opportunity to create reasonable doubt by suggest-
ing that another person committed the charged crime. This negative effect,
however, does not constitute prejudice. Prejudice involves persuasion through
illegitimate means, such as the anger a jury might feel toward a defendant
who committed prior acts of violence. See sources cited supra note 36 and ac-
companying text.
137. See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. 1965).
138. The Author has never encountered an opinion that asserts that re-
verse-Spreigl evidence carries a presumption of probativeness.
139. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 411 N.W.2d 187, 191 (1987) (upholding the
exclusion of the defendant's reverse-Spreigl evidence because it had "little or
no probative value").
140. See Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d at 172.
141. The Author has not discovered any judicial opinions stating that
courts should admit reverse-Spreigl evidence in close cases.
142. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
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direct relationship to the charged crime. While its admission
can be probative, it does not bear directly on the guilt of the ac-
cused for the crime presently charged.
B. THE REVERSE-SPREIGL STANDARD: IMPOSING LIMITATIONS
ON DEFENDANTS' ABILITY TO EXERCISE THEIR SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The preceding analysis compares reverse-Spreigl with
Spreigl evidence to illustrate the actual standard that defen-
dants must meet before they are permitted to introduce re-
verse-Spreigl evidence. The following section analyzes how the
standard implicates defendants' Sixth Amendment right to put
on a defense.
1. Classifying the Evidence for Constitutional Analysis
This Note asserts that Minnesota's reverse-Spreigl stan-
dard interferes with defendants' rights under the Sixth
Amendment. 43 Since the 1960s, courts have interpreted the
Sixth Amendment to include the right to put on a meaningful
defense.14 The Supreme Court has construed the Sixth
Amendment to include the right to introduce exculpatory evi-
dence.145 Reverse-Spreigl evidence can be classified as poten-
tially exculpatory evidence. 146 This Note argues, therefore, that
rules that make it difficult for the defendant to present reverse-
Spreigl evidence should be struck down as violating the Sixth
Amendment.147
Limitations on the admissibility of reverse-Spreigl evi-
dence would not pose the same constitutional problems if de-
143. See State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 471 (Minn. 1999) (R. Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the court's exclusion of the defendant's reverse-
Spreigl evidence "denied [the defendant] his constitutional right to present a
defense"); see also Everhart, supra note 14, at 298 (stating that "the accused in
a criminal case has a constitutional right to admit third-party guilt evidence").
144. Thomas J. Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After
Adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113, 164 (1984).
The right to put forth a meaningful defense began with Gideon v. Wainwright.
372 U.S. 335 (1963). That case provided indigent felony defendants with the
right to state-appointed legal counsel. Id. at 345.
145. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (upholding a defendant's
right to present witnesses to establish a defense under the compulsory process
clause and applying it to the states under the Due Process Clause).
146. See State v. Renekke, 563 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
147. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 285.
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fendants used the evidence to establish an affirmative de-
fense.148 States may require that the burden of production shift
to defendants with regard to affirmative defenses. 149 When the
burden shifts to the proponent of an affirmative defense, that
proponent generally must provide evidentiary support for his
affirmative defenses before moving forward with the claim. 150
Reverse-Spreigl evidence, however, is not used in the con-
text of affirmative defenses. 151 Instead, the defendant uses it to
cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution's claim. 152 Reverse-
Spreigl evidence negates a crucial element of the state's case:
that the defendant committed the charged crime. 153 In Profit,
for example, the defense attempted to introduce reverse-Spreigl
evidence to establish that the third party, rather than the de-
fendant, committed the murder at issue. 154
Since reverse-Spreigl evidence is not an affirmative de-
fense and merits Sixth Amendment protection, the state ar-
guably may not place any restrictions on its admission. 155 Un-
der this view, all limits on reverse-Spreigl evidence violate the
148. Id. at 285.
149. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977). In Patterson, the
Supreme Court held that requiring a defendant to prove he committed man-
slaughter, not murder, did not violate due process. Id. A New York statute
essentially made manslaughter an affirmative defense for defendants charged
with first-degree murder. Id. at 206.
150. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 288-89.
151. Id. at 290. Affirmative defenses typically fit into one of two categories.
Id. The first type involves excusing or justifying the commission of the
charged crime. Id. A second type of affirmative defense falls "peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused," as does a claim of insanity. Id. at 291
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3) (1985) (defining "affirmative de-
fenses")). Reverse-Spreigl evidence does not fit into either of those classifica-
tions. See id. at 290. Technically, reverse-Spreigl evidence does not introduce
a new issue in the case. See id. at 293. In the types of cases in which the de-
fendant would attempt to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence, the court must
determine whether the defendant perpetrated the charged crime. See id. The
identity of the defendant, therefore, is an element of the prosecution's case and
not a separate issue that the defendant may decide to introduce. Id.
152. State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 1997) (en banc).
153. Reverse-Spreigl evidence more closely resembles an alibi defense than
an affirmative defense. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 292. The defendant
who claims to have an alibi uses that evidence to demonstrate that he or she
was unavailable to commit the charged crime. The proponent of reverse-
Spreigl evidence uses it to show that he or she is not guilty by asserting that a
third party committed the charged crime. Id. at 293.
154. See State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 463 (Minn. 1999) (en banc).
155. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 290; see also supra note 151 and ac-
companying text.
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Constitution. 156
Although this argument is logically consistent with the
aforementioned principles, compelling interests suggest flaws
in the position. First, defendants do not have an absolute right
to bring forth exculpatory evidence.157 Defendants do not have,
for example, the power to introduce evidence that lacks all
credibility. 158 Imagine that a defendant claimed that he was
unavailable to commit the charged crime because he was vaca-
tioning on Mars. Theoretically, he has a right to introduce that
testimony. The court, however, would not permit the defendant
to present this testimony because it would be deemed irrele-
vant.259
Second, the court similarly would restrict the defendant
from presenting numerous collateral issues. 160 Consider, for
example, the case of a defendant who won a motion to suppress
evidence that the police illegally seized. In this situation, the
issue of the illegal seizure is collateral to the charged crime.
The court previously dealt with the police misconduct by ex-
cluding the evidence in question. Therefore, the court would
probably prevent the defendant from testifying about the sei-
zure issue. Defendants, therefore, likely do not have an abso-
lute right to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence.
Requiring defendants to establish the materiality of third
party evidence is an ingrained feature of the U.S. criminal jus-
tice system. 161 In Minnesota, courts have restricted the admis-
sibility of reverse-Spreigl evidence for at least seventy-five
years. 62 Most states have adopted an evidentiary rule similar
156. Everhart, supra note 14, at 275.
157. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie From the Cookie Jar?: The
Law and Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1643, 1687 (2000).
158. Id. (noting that "[a] defendant is not at liberty to present unsupported
theories.., and invite the jury to speculate as to some cause other than one
supported by the evidence").
159. Id. In this type of situation, the court would likely base its exclusion
on Minnesota's relevancy rule. MINN. R. EviD. 401.
160. See MINN. R. EVID. 403 (permitting courts to exclude relevant evi-
dence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of...
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
161. See Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 350, 356 (1891) (recognizing
that trial judges have the discretion to exclude third party evidence that has
"no legitimate tendency" to show that a third party committed the charged
crime).
162. In the 1923 case State v. Lilja, the court excluded the defendant's
third party evidence. 193 N.W. 178, 180 (Minn. 1923). For a discussion of this
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to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).163 These rules, like Minne-
sota Rule of Evidence 404(b), often require some connection be-
tween the third party and the charged crime.lM By arguing
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional, a defendant es-
sentially asks a court to reject this long-accepted principle.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided a case in which a
defendant argues that restrictions on third party evidence limit
his Sixth Amendment right to put on a defense.1 65 However,
the Supreme Court has stated that third party evidence shouldhave a "legitimate tendency" to establish that the third party
committed the charged crime. 66 The Supreme Court has also
found that defendants have a constitutional right to present
evidence that a third party committed the charged crime.
16 7
Therefore, when the Court does hear the issue, it will be more
likely to find that a standard for admitting third party evidence
violates the Sixth Amendment because it is too high than it
would be to find the mere existence of a limitation unconstitu-
tional.
The Minnesota Supreme Court also would be unlikely to
find that all limitations on the admissibility of reverse-Spreigl
evidence violate the Sixth Amendment. The court rarely com-
ments on this issue and has not cited constitutional concerns
when overturning lower courts' exclusions of reverse-Spreigl
evidence.1 68 An appropriate challenge, therefore, should attack
the rigor of particular restrictions rather than the existence of
any such limit.
exclusion, see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
163. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 45, at 404-132 to 404-162
(discussing the evidentiary rules of thirty-five states and Puerto Rico and not-
ing that each has adopted a rule similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)).
164. See Brett C. Powell, Perry Mason Meets the "Legitimate Tendency"
Standard of Admissibility (And Doesn't Like What He Sees), 55 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1023, 1030-48 (2001) (noting that California, Wisconsin, South Dakota,
and Washington all require some link between the third party and the charged
crime).
165. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 294. The Author of this Note con-
firmed that the Supreme Court has not taken such a case since the 1997 pub-
lication of the Everhart article.
166. Alexander, 138 U.S. at 356.
167. See Powell, supra note 164, at 1031 (discussing Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S. 14 (1967) ,in
support of this proposition).
168. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 536 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1995).
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2. Exploring the Rights and Principles Challenged by
Minnesota's Reverse-Spreigl Standard
When determining the admissibility of reverse-Spreigl evi-
dence, courts should narrowly apply the rules restricting de-
fendants' ability to present this evidence. Allowing its admis-
sion furthers the public policies of both avoiding false
convictions and determining what actually occurred in a
charged incident. 1
69
By preventing some defendants from introducing reliable
reverse-Spreigl evidence, Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)
does not provide sufficient protection against false convictions.
Defendants who cannot meet each element of Minnesota's re-
strictive reverse-Spreigl standard may not introduce evidence
that another party committed the charged crime. 170 Without
this information about the third party, courts and juries proba-
bly convict innocent defendants at a higher rate than they
would if they could consider the defendant's reverse-Spreigl
evidence.
The conviction of innocent defendants violates a central
principle of the U.S. criminal justice system. As Justice Harlan
stated, it is a "fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free."171 Blackstone communicated a similar con-
clusion when he stated, "[Tihe law holds that it is better that
ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer."172 The
level of proof required by Minnesota's reverse-Spreigl test,
however, suggests that the system places more value on princi-
ples other than avoiding false convictions. 17 3 As Harlan and
169. See Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility
and a Transformative Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Disclosure, 34
NEW ENG. L. REV. 809, 849 (2000) (noting that the Rules of Professional Con-
duct "are designed to preserve the truth finding and justice dispensing goals of
the legal system").
170. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233-34 (Minn. 1999) (en
banc) (upholding the exclusion of reverse-Spreigl evidence because the defen-
dant failed to connect the third party to the charged crime).
171. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
172. 4 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
173. Considerations weighing in favor of excluding reverse-Spreigl evi-
dence include preventing jury confusion, saving time and money by excluding
new issues, and avoiding surprise. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park,
"Other Crimes"Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MNN. L. REV. 529, 537, 582-
83 (1994) (discussing these issues in the context of sexual assault crimes).
Another frequently cited consideration involves protecting innocent third par-
ties from accusations by defendants. See State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150,
1056 [Vol.86:1033
REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE
Blackstone suggest, guarding against the conviction and pun-
ishment of innocent defendants should be among the system's
highest priorities.
The reverse-Spreigl standard also fails to advance truth-
finding. The current standard prevents some defendants from
providing the tribunal with the information necessary to impli-
cate a guilty party. If the proper authorities use this informa-
tion to charge and convict a third party, the reverse-Spreigl
evidence helps courts arrive at the truth.
The Supreme Court has twice noted that restricting the
admission of potentially exculpatory evidence makes courts less
capable of discovering the truth.174 In those cases, the Court
held that a court may exclude relevant exculpatory evidence
without violating the Constitution when the exclusion helps the
judicial process operate more rationally.175 These cases support
excluding reverse-Spreigl evidence when it may confuse the
jury or prejudice the defendant, thereby impeding the rational-
ity of the proceeding. 17 6 The Supreme Court's exclusion of evi-
dence in the two applicable cases, however, functioned to pun-
ish and deter serious procedural errors by the defense. 177 The
reverse-Spreigl evidence contemplated by this Note does not
perform this function. Rather, the evidence helps the defense
establish its claim that the prosecution charged the wrong per-
son with the crime. The grounds the Supreme Court has previ-
ously used to exclude defendants' evidence, therefore, do not
apply in the reverse-Spreigl cases under consideration.
Defendants often face substantial obstacles when trying to
159 (Minn. 1977). The Hawkins court suggested that requiring proof of a con-
nection between the third party and the charged crime "safeguards the third
[party] from indiscriminate use of past differences with the [crime victim]."
Id.
174. See Donald A. Dripps, Relevant But Prejudicial Exculpatory Evidence:
Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1389, 1404-07 (1996). The relevant cases are Michigan v. Lucas, 500
U.S. 145, 149 (1991), and Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988).
175. In Taylor, the Court upheld the exclusion of testimony by a witness
whom the defense had not identified in discovery. 484 U.S. at 401-02. Lucas
also involved the exclusion of evidence due to the defense's failure to notify the
prosecution of its intention to introduce that evidence. 500 U.S. at 146. The
Lucas Court reversed an appellate court holding that determined the Sixth
Amendment gave rape defendants an absolute right to introduce evidence of
prior consensual sex with the complainant. Id. at 152-53. In this context, ra-
tionality means "finding the facts according to evidence" rather than according
to other considerations, such as emotion. Dripps, supra note 174, at 1397.
176. See Dripps, supra note 174, at 1397.
177. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 146; Taylor, 484 U.S. at 402.
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assemble third party evidence that meets the reverse-Spreigl
standard. First are the hurdles presented by police attempts to
build a case against the defendant.17 8 After a suspect has been
identified, "police have little incentive to investigate further,
especially if that investigation may weaken the case already
built."179 Police officers face considerable pressure to "clear"
cases, particularly those that are notorious or violent. 180 These
demands make it "easy to believe that investigation tends to fo-
cus on building a case against a suspect rather than on explor-
ing leads and preserving evidence that might suggest the sus-
pect's innocence."' 1 Following the identification of a suspect,
the police generally will gather evidence "with an eye to con-
victing [that] suspect.' 82 Even if the evidence suggests another
perpetrator committed the crime, investigating police depart-
ments do not have a constitutional duty to preserve evidence
that might exculpate defendants. 8 3
Secondly, most defendants face financial challenges when
they attempt to investigate a third party's involvement in the
charged crime. To reduce their legal expenses, defendants with
private attorneys may have to restrict the number of hours
spent on investigation. For the growing number of individuals
represented by public defenders, excessive caseloads inhibit the
defendants' ability to gather evidence about the third parties
who may have committed the charged crimes. Overwhelming
caseloads and inadequate resources typify public defense sys-
tems.184 A study conducted for the State Board of Public De-
178. See Dripps, supra note 174, at 1416-17.
179. See Suni, supra note 157, at 1690.
180. See id.
181. See Dripps, supra note 174, at 1416-17 (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 1417.
183. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1988). In Youngblood, the
defendant faced charges of molesting and sodomizing a ten-year-old boy. Id.
at 53. Following the assault, the victim received treatment at a hospital. Id.
His doctor collected evidence with a sexual assault kit. Id. at 52. The police
department did not perform tests on either the samples assembled for the sex-
ual assault kit or the victim's clothing. Id. at 53. The defendant claimed that
the evidence would have exculpated him and that the police department vio-
lated his constitutional rights by not performing the tests. See id. at 54. The
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the failure to perform the tests can "at
worst be described as negligent" and therefore did not involve a constitutional
violation. Id. at 58.
184. David L. Wilson, Note, Constitutional Law: Making A Case for Pre-
serving the Integrity of Minnesota's Public Defender System: Kennedy v. Carl-
son, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1117, 1138 (1996); see also William J. Stuntz,
The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
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fense revealed that "public defenders in Minnesota, with few
exceptions, are working substantially above capacity with in-
sufficient time to devote to their cases and clients.... And
things are getting worse in this regard."185
Following the rejection of a request for more funds, the
Chief Public Defender of Hennepin County186 sued a host of
Minnesota politicians. 187 The suit sought to establish that in-
sufficient budgets prevented the County Public Defender's Of-
fice from providing sufficient services to its clients. 188 The Pub-
lic Defender's Office argued that this lack of funds violated the
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel of in-
digent criminal defendants. 189 While the Supreme Court of
Minnesota rejected this claim, 190 the case is indicative of the
funding problems in the Minnesota's Public Defenders' Office.
Defendants who cannot properly investigate the third party's
involvement in the charged crime have little hope of meeting
Minnesota's strict standard for admitting reverse-Spreigl evi-
dence.
States may place reasonable restrictions on defendants'
ability to introduce third party evidence. 191 Minnesota's stan-
dard, however, requires defendants to meet an unreasonably
high standard before introducing reverse-Spreigl evidence,
thereby infringing on defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
Reverse-Spreigl evidence helps courts further the public poli-
cies of avoiding false convictions and arriving at the truth. In
addition, cost and excessive attorney caseloads hamper defen-
107 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1997) (noting that current societal trends encourage un-
der-fimding criminal defense systems).
185. Wilson, supra note 184, at 1140-41 (quoting THE SPANGENBERG
GROUP, WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE OF MINNESOTA BOARD OF
PUBLIC DEFENSE-DRAFT REPORT 20 (1991)). Across Minnesota, public de-
fenders have unionized in an attempt to improve these conditions. Tony Ken-
nedy, Public Defenders Outside Hennepin, Ramsey Counties Vote to Join Un-
ion, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 14, 1999, at D3. "An attorney has an
ethical duty to investigate a client's claims thoroughly so he or she may give
sound legal advice." Wilson, supra note 184, at 1139. In many cases, public
defenders cannot conduct "any worthwhile investigation" because of inade-
quate funding. Id. at 1140.
186. Hennepin County includes the City of Minneapolis.
187. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996). The named officials
included the Governor, Treasurer, Finance Commissioner, State Board of Pub-
lic Defense, and Hennepin County Commissioners. Id. at 3.
188. Id. at 3.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 8.
191. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
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dants' efforts to conduct sufficient investigations. 192 For these
reasons, defendants should not be required to meet the current
reverse-Spreigl standard before introducing evidence suggest-
ing that a third party committed the charged crime.
III. AMENDING MINNESOTA RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B):
A PROPOSAL TO CREATE A SEPARATE ADMISSIBILITY
STANDARD FOR REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE
Part II.A of this Note argued that courts apply Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 404(b) more strictly when defendants, rather
than prosecutors, use the rule to introduce evidence. 193 Even if
courts applied the standard identically, however, reverse-
Spreigl rules may still infringe on defendants' Sixth Amend-
ment rights. In the manner that courts currently apply those
rules, the constitutional violation is even more egregious. Ac-
cordingly, Minnesota should amend the applicable evidentiary
rule to include a separate standard for defendants attempting
to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence.
The proposed rule retains the text of Minnesota's current
standard for admitting Spreigl evidence.194 To differentiate it
from the defendants' standard, "Spreigl Evidence Admissibility
Standard" should be added to the current title of Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 404(b). 19 5 The rule should be amended to in-
clude a second standard, numbered 404(c) 196 and titled "Re-
verse-Spreigl Admissibility Standard." The text of the
192. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
193. This comparison suggests that in practice the standard for admitting
reverse-Spreigl evidence actually is higher than the standard established by
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). See supra notes 111-42 and accompanying
text.
194. See supra note 40 and accompanying text for Minnesota Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b).
195. Its current title is "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts." MINN. R. EVID.
404(b). The addition to the title should be inserted following the existing title
and preceded by a semicolon. The title change reflects the language used in
Minnesota case law to describe this rule. The amended title also provides a
context for the reverse-Spreigl admissibility standard.
196. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404 formerly included a provision labeled
404(c), which dealt with defendants' past sexual conduct with victims. MINN.
R. EviD. 404. In 1990, the provision was renumbered Minnesota Rule of Evi-
dence 412. Id.; see supra note 40. Twelve years have passed since that change
became effective. The renumbering brought the Minnesota Rules into confor-
mity with the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 412. Therefore,
numbering the reverse-Spreigl admissibility standard as Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 404(c) is unlikely to create confusion.
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amended rule should appear as follows: 197
Reverse-Spreigl Admissibility Standard. Any person charged with a
crime may introduce evidence which suggests that a third party,
rather than the defendant, committed the crime. Courts shall admit
such evidence if it is relevant pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Evidence
401.198 Courts, however, may exclude reverse-Spreigl evidence pur-
suant to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403199 if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues, mis-
leading the jury, or creating undue delay.200 If appealed, any exclu-
sion of reverse-Spreigl evidence shall receive de novo review.
This amended standard facilitates the introduction of reli-
able reverse-Spreigl evidence. The high standard developed in
State v. Spreigl functions to protect defendants from prejudice.
However, reverse-Spreigl evidence cannot prejudice defendants
because the evidence involves the conduct of third parties. By
lowering the standard for reverse-Spreigl evidence, the pro-
posed rule reflects the fact that prejudice is not an issue in re-
verse-Spreigl cases. The amended rule safeguards defendants'
Sixth Amendment rights by providing them with a viable
means of introducing evidence showing that a third party
committed the crime at issue.
Even with the implementation of proposed Minnesota Rule
of Evidence 404(c), the relevancy requirement of Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 401 still ensures that defendants may only in-
troduce evidence with some bearing on the charged crime.201 If
a defendant cannot produce evidence that makes it somewhat
more likely that the third party committed the charged crime
than it would be without the evidence, the trial judge should
exclude the reverse-Spreigl evidence. Under the proposed rule,
courts may exclude reverse-Spreigl evidence if the danger of
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or creating undue de-
197. The Author generated this text based in part on a proposal for redraft-
ing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to include a separate standard for defen-
dants. See Larsen, supra note 133, at 692-94.
198. "Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." MINN.
R. EviD. 401.
199. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." MINN. R. EVID. 403.
200. This text omits the prejudice language from Minnesota Rule of Evi-
dence 403 because third parties are not prejudiced by reverse-Spreigl evi-
dence. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 198.
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lay substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
This provision prevents defendants from hampering the pro-
ceeding by creating a smokescreen of useless and misleading
information. The de novo standard of review protects defen-
dants from aggressive judicial use of the confusion and delay
exceptions. A judge who misconstrues reverse-Spreigl evidence
as duplicative, useless, or misleading is more likely to be over-
ruled on appeal under a de novo standard of review.
CONCLUSION
Allowing defendants to introduce credible reverse-Spreigl
evidence improves Minnesota's criminal justice system. The
admission of such evidence allows the state to avoid false con-
victions and determine what actually occurred in charged
crimes. When courts admit reverse-Spreigl evidence, they
avoid punishing defendants for their inability to conduct an in-
tensive investigation. Similarly, the state rejects the hypocrisy
of a system in which the prosecution, but not the defense, can
admit evidence of prior bad acts. Most importantly, when
courts admit such evidence, they uphold defendants' constitu-
tional rights. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) should be
amended to ensure that defendants receive a fair opportunity
to admit reverse-Spreigl evidence. With such a change, Minne-
sota's criminal justice system may motivate other states, and
even the federal government, to evaluate the effect of their re-
spective third party evidence rules on defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights.
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